OM

Ajnanatimirintasyajnananjanasalakaya

Cakshurunmilitam yena tasmai 

srigurave namah

ADVAITA VEDANTA

D   Krishna Ayyar

APPENDIX 3
EXPLANATORY NOTES

Note No. 11  

Note No. 11 -  Views of Buddhist schools about reality refuted

(1) In Buddhism, there are two branches - Hinayana and Mahayana. There are two schools in the Hinayana branch – Sountrantika and Vaibhashika. Both accept the existence of a  world of objects outside the mind and maintain that any object has only momentary existence. This is called  “ubhaya astitva vada”. (There is an internal difference, between Soutrantika and Vaibhashika, which is not relevant for the purposes of this discussion. The internal difference is - for the Sautrantika,  the acceptance of the  existence of a world outside the mind is a matter of perception and for the Vibhashika, it is a matter of inference.) In the Mahayana also, there are two schools – Yogacara  which denies the existence of the world outside the mind and Madhyamika,  called also “Sunyavada”, which denies cognition as well as object, For this school, reality is nothingness.  Sautrantika, Vaibhashika and Yogacara – all three – say that consciousness is momentary. (They do not accept any unchanging consciousness.) That is to say, one cognition arises, exists for just a moment and disappears before the next cognition arises. This doctrine is called “Kshanika Vijnanam”.. In effect, there are three main doctrines – (i) “Ubhaya astitva vada” - the doctrine that there is a world of objects having momentary existence, (ii) “Kshanika vijnanam” - the doctrine that there is no external world at  all ; what there is  only consciousness and that consciousness is momentary and (iii) “Sunyavada” – the doctrine that reality is nothingness  .   In Brahmasutra, Vysacarya and in his Bhashyams, Sankaracarya refute (i) the doctrine that there is no world outside the mind (ii) the doctrine that consciousness is momentary and (iii) the doctrine that reality is nothingness.

(2) The Hinayana doctrine that any object in the external world has only momentary existence is refuted as follows:-

(i) It is contradictory to the Hinayana doctrine of cause –effect relationship (“karya-karana sambandha”). If Hinayana philosophers  want to maintain karya karana sambandha , they have to give up the idea of momentary existence of objects or vice versa, because the essential nature of a cause continues to inhere in the effect; for example, clay continues to exist when pot shape is given to a lump of clay and certain chemical elements of milk continue to exist when milk turns into curd . 

(ii) Our experience is – and science also tells us – that matter is never totally destroyed. It only changes from one form into another ( law of conservation of energy and matter.)

(iii) Buddhism also believes in rebirth and the cycle of samsara.  And it talks of deliberate destruction (“prasankyana nirodha”) of samsara by the seeker pursuing certain spiritual practices (“sadhana”). If samsara like everything else has only momentary existence, and will in any case die a natural death, in  a moment, where is the question of deliberate destruction through sadhana? So, the doctrine of momentary existence of objects and the concept of sadhana do not go together. 

(iv) If it is said that every object has only momentary existence, it means that every object is created out of nothing; such creation is contrary to experience.

(v) The fact that for growing a mango tree, we sow mango seed and not cocoanut seed proves that a specific material transforms into a specific product. This proves continued existence of an object in a different form, not momentariness.

(vi) If nothingness is the cause of objects, since cause inheres in effect, we should be experiencing only nothingness everywhere, but we say ‘pot is ‘ , tree is’ etc.

(vii) If nothing is required for producing something, to accomplish a thing, no effort would be needed.

 (3) The Mayhayana doctrine that there is no external world outside the mind is refuted as follows:-

(1) Our experience clearly proves the existence of a world outside the mind. If there is only consciousness and there is no external world at all, how is it that cognition is not uniform but varied and differniated like a tree, river, mountain, a man , an animal and so on and like colour, sound, smell etc.

(2) In sushupti, we continue to have consciousness but there is no cognition only because contact of sense organs and mind with external objects is severed. The moment we wake up, the contact is revived and there is cognition of external objects.

(3) To explain cognition of differentiated objects, the Mahayana philosopher says that what appear as differentiated objects are impurities of kshanika vijnanam. This is countered by pointing out that impurities in a substance are not the same as the substance. Since the only thing that this Mahayana philosopher accepts is kshanika vijnanam, there is no place for anything else such as impurities. Now, he tries to escape by saying that impurities are also kshanika vijananams. The absurdity of this statement is pointed out by saying that since, in this school, kshanika vijananams are the reality, if impurities are kshanka vijnanams, impurities can never be removed – which means that there is no moksha.

(4) Unless the existence of a world outside the mind is conceded, how can one explain the distinction between a thought arising from the contact of the mind through the sense organs with an object outside and a mere thought when no external object is present? Sitting in Chennai one thinks of Varanasi. Later, one travels to Varanasi and bathes in the Ganga. One is in office and is thinking that he forgot to tell his wife, before leaving for office, that he was taking her to a cinema in the evening. Later, one comes home and takes one’s wife to a theatre. One is wondering why one’s friend has not come. Later, the friend comes and one talks to one’s friend for half an hour. One imagines how nice it would to have ice cream when it is so hot. In the evening, one goes to the ice cream parlour and takes ice cream. One comes back from a holiday in the Himalayas and returning to Chennai, remembers the cold in the Himalayas while he is walking in the scorching sun in Anna Salai. If there is no external world, how can all this be explained? Even for a jivan mukta, there is an external world outside the mind, on the vyaharika plane.To this , the Buddhist uses a counter argument and cites the example of the dream which is really only thoughts in the mind but which, nevertheless, are perceived as objects. This is refuted by saying that there is a difference; objects perceived in the dream are known to be false when we wake up but the objects of the waking world are not negated every morning like that. Further, whereas swapna prapanca (the dream world) is nothing but the vasanas within the mind of the particular person and it being outside is only an illusion and no other person perceives it  jagrat prapanca  actually exists outside the mind and the same objects are perceived by all persons..   If it is held that jagrat prapanca is  also only in the mind, one should be able to say which is the other world the experience of which could produce the vasanas which can be projected by the mind as the jagrat prapanca. For this, there will be no answer. Further,

how can you explain the distinction between  erroneous perception like perception of snake on the rope and right perception of rope as rope? None of the above phenomena can be explained unless the existence of an external world outside the mind is conceded. ( In Advaita Vedanta also, in certain formulations, , it is said that there is no external world. But, there, a world outside the mind is not denied. What is pointed out is that there is no world of the same order of reality as Brahman, the parmnartika satyam;  both the world and the mind are superimpositions on Brahman and are categorised as vyavaharika satyam.)

(4)  The doctrine that consciousness has  only momentary existence (kshanika vijnanam) is refuted as follows:-

(i) If it is held that consciousness arises, exists for just a moment only and is gone before the next consciousness arises, one cannot explain memory (“smriti”). We remember only what we have experienced. Experience occurs first and recollection thereafter. Only if there is a consciousness that exists continuously from the time of experience up to the time of recollection can the mind connect the past and the present and produce the recollection vritti. That the mind so connects is adequate proof of the existence of a permanent consciousness. Unless the same consciousness which was there at the time of experience is still there at the time of remembrance, one cannot say that one remembers that one experienced a particular object in terms such as “I remember that I met Devadatta during the festival at the temple.”  If there is nothing like a continuous consciousness, remembrance cannot take place.

(ii) If consciousness is momentary, recognition (“pratyabhinja”) cannot take place. The difference between smriti and pratyabhinja is that in smriti, the object experienced is not present at the time of remembrance; in pratyabhinja, the object experienced is present at the time of recognition. Pratyabhinja also proves the continued existence of the subject, besides proving the continued existence of the object. Unless the same consciousness was there at the time of the first experience and is still there at the time of the subsequent experience, one cannot recognise the object experienced previously and being experienced currently to be the same, in terms such as “ The Devadatta who is now in front of me is the same Devadatta whom I met during the festival at the temple.”

(iii) To this, there is a counter-argument by the Kshanika vijanana adherents.  They say that the person you see now is not the same person you met earlier. That person existed only at that moment. This person exists only at this moment. You are deluded into thinking that it is the same person because the person that existed then and the person existing now are similar. And they give the example of the flame appearing to be the same, though, at each moment, a separate drop of oil is being burnt and the example of the  stream appearing to be a continuous entity, even though the water molecules that were there at any given point a moment ago have been replaced by another set of molecules already. The Vedantin refutes this by saying that even for recognising similarity between an object that existed in the past and an object that exists at present, the same consciousness that experienced the object in the past should exist at present. Even if one may say that similarity of objects is possible in rare cases, how can anybody doubt the recognition of oneself as a continuous personality? One says “I who went to bed yesterday and slept soundly am now awake and am talking to my wife about our program of visits this Sunday.” Unless the same “I” consciousness that was there when one went to bed yesterday is continuing to exist now when one is awake and talking to one’s wife, how can this phenomenon be explained. (The kshanika vijnanam of the Buddhists is the ahamkara of Advaita Vedanta. In Advaita Vedanta, besides ahamkara, which is the changing consciousness, there is atma  (sakshi), the unchanging consciousness, invoked as the constant I existing during the changing cognitions of the mind.)

(iv) In Advaita Makarandam, the author uses a clinching argument. A person can never know his own birth or death. One’s birth is the last moment of one’s prior non-existence. One’s death is the first moment of one’s posterior non-existence. One is not there to know either. Like that a momentary consciousness cannot know that it is momentary. It is not there when it is born and it is not there when it dies. Another momentary consciousness cannot know it either, because consciousness No.1 dies before consciousness No.2 is born and consciousness No.3 is not yet born when consciousness No2 dies. So, the question is who is there to know that consciousness is momentary? Unless a continuous consciousness is accepted, the existence of momentary consciousness or a series of momentary consciousnesses that succeed one another cannot be established.  

(v).  If all that there is  momentary consciousness,

(a) there cannot be any notion of means and ends. When the thought of end comes, the thought of means is gone.

(b) There cannot be any notion of possessor and possessed. When the thought of possessed comes, the thought of possessor has gone, and

(c) there cannot be the notion of an article having a name. When the thought of name comes, the thought of the article has gone.

(5)  Vyasacarya and Sankaracarya do not bother to refute the doctrine that reality is nothingness (Sunyavada).  Vidyarnya refutes it by asking the philosopher who says that there is nothing “You say that there is nothing. But are you there or not?” He cannot but say “I am”. This is enough to establish that to say that there is nothing is absurd.

 Perception depends on the kind of sense organs and mind one possesses. The jagrat prapanca we see is not the same as, say, a chameleon sees with eyes positioned to look at the front and rear simultaneously or a horse or dog sees with a vision of only two dimensions. The horse will see a sphere as a mere circle, when it goes round it. In Vayu loka, you can travel in air on your own. Devas are said  to have the capacity to enjoy food, drink and experience the sensual enjoyment by merely looking at the objects.  Rishis are said to be able to cause conception by merely looking at a woman.

 THIS IS APPENDIX 3